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Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico:
A Legal and Practical Analysis.
“[Over the past century] overfishing was the leading environmental issue affecting 
our seas. In the new millennium, it's going to be oxygen."
- Robert J. Diaz, Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences1
Each year, a large area of the Gulf of Mexico is seasonally depleted of life-giving 
oxygen. Called hypoxia, the phenomenon threatens to bring about a collapse of the Gulf’s marine 
ecosystem,2 harming commercial fisheries with an annual economic worth estimated at $2.8 
billion.3 The Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force is a voluntary 
regime formed to address this and other threats to the Gulf of Mexico and is comprised of 
federal, state, and tribal representatives.4  The Task Force has set a year 2015 goal of 
considerably reducing the size of the Gulf hypoxic area to less than 5,000 square kilometers by 
2015.5 Implementation of this goal will entail an estimated reduction in nitrogen loading to the 
Gulf of at least thirty percent.6
This note analyzes the conceptual transformation of this voluntary regime into a 
regulatory one. Such a regulatory regime would be based on the development of federal “Total 
1 Janet Raloff, Dead Waters: Massive oxygen-starved zones are developing along the world's coasts, 165 SCI. NEWS
360 (2004), available at http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20040605/bob9.asp.
2 See Id.
3 US NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 
An Integrated Assessment of  Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico, May, 2000, at 7. [hereinafter, INTEGRATED 
ASSESSMENT].
4 See Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force web page at
http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/members.htm.
5 MISSISSIPPI RIVER/GULF OF MEXICO WATERSHED NUTRIENT TASK FORCE, ACTION PLAN FOR REDUCING, 
MITIGATING, AND CONTROLLING HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO (2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/actionplan.pdf. [hereinafter, ACTION PLAN].
6 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Maximum Daily Loads” (TMDLs or “pollution budgets”) for the parameters of nitrogen and 
phosphorus under the framework established by section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act,7 and 
implementation of nutrient reductions through a pollution trading program. Because the CWA 
only permits regulation of “point sources” of pollution, a term that specifically exempts 
agricultural run-off,8 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could not implement a 
Mississippi River Basin nutrient TMDL through direct federal regulation of agricultural non-
point sources of pollution. 9 However, a TMDL-based, regulatory regime for the Mississippi 
River watershed, implemented through a pollution trading program, would give state and federal 
agencies leverage to effectively “bargain” for non-point source reductions.10
This note analyzes the Clean Water Act (CWA or “the Act”) and finds that the statute 
itself does not expressly answer the question of the extent to which the EPA may regulate 
upstream point sources of pollution that degrade federal ocean waters beyond the “territorial 
seas” - a term defined in the statute as a “belt of the seas... extending seaward [from shore] a 
distance of three miles.”11 Nonetheless, it concludes that the most reasonable reading is that the 
statute does confer to the EPA discretionary authority under the Act to develop and implement a 
7 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000). See also text accompanying notes 109 to 112.
8
 The CWA defines a “point source” as any “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated 
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This 
term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(14) (2000).
9 See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the lack of a mandate in the CWA for the 
implementation of TMDLs through reduction of nonpoint sources of pollution).
10 See William F. Pederson, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for Private Land Use Control, 21 
YALE J. on REG. 1 (2004) (Discussing the value of the federal government replacing regulations with “bargaining 
entitlements” which can be used to negotiate with private parties to influence land use in order to achieve 
environmental improvement.)
11 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2000).
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regulatory regime to restore those waters of the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial seas. 
Furthermore, it concludes that the broad mandate of section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Act,12
considered in conjunction with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act13 and the 
Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,14 reinforces this conclusion. 
Nonetheless, it recommends that Congress amend the Clean Water Act, expressly delegating 
authority to the EPA to provide for the stewardship of the quality of U.S. ocean waters, and 
revising the Act’s marine jurisdictional lines in order to make them consistent with general U.S.
jurisdiction over adjacent marine waters. This note then considers whether, as a practical matter, 
a regulatory regime is preferable to a voluntary one. It concludes that a regulatory regime is 
indeed preferable, particularly if a pollution-trading framework is used to grant regulated entities 
some flexibility and to permit the regime to attain the most cost-effective reductions through a 
combination of point source and non-point source reductions. 
This note is divided into the following sections. Part IA discusses the phenomenon of 
hypoxia generally. Part IB gives an overview of hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico. Part IC discusses 
the existing regime to control Gulf hypoxia, briefly outlining the contours of a proposed 
regulatory regime. Part ID outlines five elements of Gulf hypoxia that make both legal and 
practical analysis of the problem particularly challenging. Part IIA considers the EPA’s authority 
to regulate Gulf pollution under the Clean Water Act. Part IIB argues that the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the Endangered Species Act, when read in light 
of section 301(b)(1)(c) of the Clean Water Act, confer additional responsibilities upon the 
12
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000).
13
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (2000).
14
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000).
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Administrator of EPA with respect to Gulf hypoxia. Part IIC considers two potential 
opportunities to interject into Congressional debate consideration of the value of amending the 
Clean Water Act. The two specific opportunities discussed are Congressional consideration of 
the ratification of UNCLOS) and the proposed “Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 
2005.” Part III engages in a practical analysis regarding development and implementation of an 
enforceable pollution control regime for the Gulf. Finally, Part IV concludes with recommended 
actions to reverse the trend of a growing hypoxic area in the Gulf of Mexico. 
I. An Overview of Gulf Hypoxia
A. The Phenomenon of Hypoxia
In a fine example of “too much of a good thing,” nutrient over-enrichment is starving 
marine waters across the globe of life-giving oxygen.15  While minor increases in nutrient levels 
generally correlate with increased productivity in aquatic ecosystems,16 excessive nutrient inputs 
initiate a biological chain reaction called eutrophication. Eutrophication entails multiple aquatic 
ecosystem responses, often including decreased dissolved oxygen concentrations.17 Average 
dissolved oxygen concentrations of approximately 5 milligrams per liter (mg/l) are generally 
required to support healthy aquatic ecosystems.18 Low dissolved oxygen conditions are referred 
15 See Robert J. Diaz, Overview of Hypoxia Around the World, 30 J. ENVIRON. QUAL. 275 (2001), available at 
http://jeq.scijournals.org/cgi/reprint/30/2/275.
16 Id.at 276. However, it is important to note that even as increased nutrients may lead to increased productivity, 
biodiversity of the affected system may be decreased through simplification of the food web. For more information 
see the US EPA Eutrophication web site at http://www.epa.gov/maia/html/eutroph.html.
17
 The chain reaction essentially works as follows:  increased nutrient inputs result in the proliferation of algal 
growths, which then sink into the heavier and more saline waters that are stratified below, robbing these waters of 
oxygen as the plant biomass decays.
18 See, e.g., US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), NATIONAL RECOMMENDED WATER QUALITY 
CRITERIA (2002) at 6 (“For many fish and shellfish, extended periods of D.O. below 5 mg/l can cause adverse 
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to as hypoxia when levels drop below 2 mg/l. 19  Hypoxic waters are sufficiently depleted of 
dissolved oxygen that most marine life cannot survive in them for more than short durations.20
Hypoxia tends to occur where anthropogenic nutrient inputs meet a stratified water column.21
Areas where large freshwater inflows meet relatively calm marine environments are susceptible 
to hypoxia due to the level of stratification naturally occurring in these systems.22 While
increased levels of phosphorus (and, to a small extent, silica) can cause or contribute to hypoxic 
conditions, nitrogen loading is usually the primary culprit. 23 These nutrients are being introduced 
into aquatic ecosystems in increasing amounts through agricultural practices (especially the use 
of synthetic fertilizers); increased discharges from municipal sewage treatment plants and septic 
systems, industrial discharges, and other sources such as deposition from air pollutants – all of 
which may be viewed as a function of human population growth.24
B. Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico
effects to larval stages.”), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/pc/revcom.pdf;  See also, US EPA, 
AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN (SALTWATER): CAPE COD TO CAPE HATTERAS (2000) 
(defining multiple dissolved oxygen criteria, and generally finding that survival of juvenile and adult marine species 
requires that D.O. levels not drop below 2.3 mg/L for 24 hours or more, and that prevention of adverse effects on 
growth of adult and juvenile species requires that D.O. levels not drop below 4.8 mg/l for 24 hours or more.),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/dissolved/docriteria.pdf    The precise levels of oxygen 
required to support healthy marine ecosystems is a matter that continues to be debated.
19
 The related phenomenon of anoxia occurs when waters are completely devoid of oxygen. 
20
 See Diaz supra note 15, at 276.
21
 Stratification occurs when warmer, less saline waters essentially float on top of denser, more saline waters. 
22 See Diaz, supra note 15, at 276.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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In late spring of each year, an area of hypoxic water begins to form in the Gulf of 
Mexico, expanding in size over the summer, and disappearing again in the fall.25 Because the 
benthos and lower water column in the vast area affected by seasonal hypoxia are mostly devoid 
of life during times when hypoxia is occurring, Gulf hypoxia is often popularly called “the dead 
zone.”26 Gulf hypoxia was first documented in 1972.27 The aerial extent of hypoxia differs from 
year to year, as a function of varying nutrient levels and freshwater inflows into the Gulf in the 
spring and summer months, but the clear trend has been an increase over time.28 The spatial 
extent of Gulf hypoxia more than doubled in size after the Mississippi River flood of 1993, 
covering an area of over 18,000 km², and remaining about that size each year through 
midsummer 1997.29 In 1999 the Gulf hypoxic area covered about 20,000 km² (about 8,000 
square miles);30 and in 2002 it reached its maximum extent of about 22,000 km² - an area larger 
than the state of Massachusetts.31 Gulf hypoxia occurs primarily off the shores of Louisiana, 
25 See Nancy N. Rabalais et al., Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico 30 J. ENVIRON. QUAL. 320, 321 (2001).
26 This term is more appealing than “hypoxia” because it articulates the seriousness of the problem in common 
language. However, the term is somewhat misleading for at least three reasons. First, it implies a fixed area; 
however, the aerial extent of Gulf hypoxia varies dramatically both intra and inter-annually. Second, unlike in some 
other areas of the world where hypoxia occurs, the phenomenon in the Gulf is seasonal. During much of the year 
fish and aquatic life are able to make use of the areas which experience Gulf hypoxia. As hypoxia begins to occur, 
more mobile species are able to escape hypoxic waters, while populations of less mobile species perish.  However, 
even these less mobile species are able to seasonally re-colonize benthic habits, at least to some extent, as oxygen 
levels again rise in the seasonally affected areas. See, e.g., US NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, 
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, An Integrated Assessment of  Hypoxia in the Northern 
Gulf of Mexico, May, 2000, at 31. Thus, the Gulf hypoxic area is not truly a “dead zone;” rather, it is a complex, 
variable ecosystem response to increased nutrient loading.
27 See Rabalais, supra note 25, at 321.
28 See Id.
29 See NOAA, National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, Gulf of Mexico Hypoxia Assessment web page at
http://www.nos.noaa.gov/products/pubs_hypox.html#Intro.
30 See ACTION PLAN supra note 5.
31 See USGS, Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic Zone web site at http://toxics.usgs.gov/hypoxia/hypoxic_zone.html.
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though some years it extends west to the coast of Texas. The hypoxic waters extend from near 
shore environments seaward to between 55 and 130 km from shore.32 Also, when the Mississippi 
River’s flow is high and summer currents distribute more of its nutrient-laden waters to the east, 
related (but distinct) areas of hypoxia may appear in bathymetric lows off the coast of 
Alabama.33 There is considerable debate regarding the extent to which increased nutrient levels
are effectively the sole cause of Gulf hypoxia, or whether hydrological alteration or other factors 
are significant.34 However, it is clear, at least, that nutrient pollution is the primary cause of Gulf 
hypoxia. A three-fold increase in the nitrogen load to the Gulf over the past three decades or so is 
generally viewed as the primary culprit.35 However, phosphorus loading is also an important 
factor,36 and a recent EPA Region 4 analysis suggests that phosphorus may indeed be more 
important than previously believed, particularly in the eastern portion of the hypoxic area.37
32 See Rabalais, supra note 25, at 322. (Noting also that gulf hypoxia extends to about 55 km from shore where the 
continental shelf slopes more steeply, and to about 130 km where the gradient is more gradual.) 55 km is equivalent 
to about 29.6 nautical miles. 130 km is equivalent to about 70.2 nautical miles.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Nancy N. Rabalais, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 321 (1999) (Arguing water 
quality degradation as the cause and discounting importance of hydrologic modification); but see, the Fertilizer 
Institute web site at www.tfi.org. (arguing that there are multiple causes, and thus nitrogen loading is not the sole 
culprit).
35 See Donald Scavia, Nancy N. Rabalais et. al., Predicting the response of Gulf of Mexico hypoxia to variations in 
Mississippi River nitrogen load, 48(3) LIMNOL. OCEANOGR. 951, 951 (2003).
36 See Rabalais, supra note 25, at 322.
37 See US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 4, EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF NITROGEN AND 
PHOSPHORUS IN CAUSING OR CONTRIBUTING TO HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF (August, 2004) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/region4report.htm. (calling for reductions in both nitrogen and 
phosphorus loading as the proper strategy for reducing gulf hypoxia). See also U.S. EPA, Final Meeting Summary: 
Eleventh Meeting of the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force, September 1, 2004 at 
https://www.epa.gov/msbasin/meet_summ11.pdf (Containing the following summary of the presentation of Mr. Jim 
Giattina, EPA Region 4: “The eastern part of the hypoxia region of the Gulf is phosphorus limited and the western 
zone is nitrogen limited, which suggests that a dual nitrogen and phosphorus reduction strategy would be 
appropriate.”).
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C. The Current Voluntary Regime and a Concept for a Regulatory Regime.
Congress enacted the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act on 
November 13, 1998.38 The statute required the President to create an “Inter-Agency Task Force
on Harmful Algal Blooms and Hypoxia” and charged the Task Force with the duty to complete 
an assessment of Gulf hypoxia and submit a report to Congress within twelve months.39
Pursuant to the statute, the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force 
convened for the first time in the fall of 1997.40  The Task Force submitted to Congress its Action 
Plan for Reducing, Mitigating and Controlling Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico on 
January 18, 2001.41  The plan set the goal of reducing the five-year running average of the 
overall size of the Gulf hypoxic area to less than 5,000 square kilometers by 2015.42 In order to 
achieve this goal, the plan estimates that a 30% reduction in nitrogen discharges to the Gulf will 
be necessary; however, more recent analyses conclude that even greater reductions may be 
necessary.43 The plan calls for attainment of its goals through voluntary nutrient reduction 
strategies and the use of existing regulatory programs.44  The task force is currently working with 
the EPA Gulf of Mexico program and stakeholder groups to implement a regime that includes 
monitoring Gulf of Mexico hypoxia and encouraging voluntary controls.
38
 Public Law 105-383, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 note (2000).
39 Id.
40 See ACTION PLAN supra note 5, at 34.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 12.
43 Id. (The baseline for this targeted reduction is established using the average of nitrogen discharge from 1980 to 
1996.) See also, Donald Scavia, supra note 35 (concluding that 30% reductions might not be sufficient, and that 
nitrogen reductions between 35% and 45% may be necessary).
44 Id.
Brad McLane Gulf Hypoxia
9
As an alternative to this voluntary regime, a regulatory regime could be created under the 
framework of the Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements.45 In 
such a regime, the EPA would develop two TMDLs, one each for nitrogen and phosphorus. 
Ideally, EPA would subsequently work with states to implement the requisite reductions through 
a combination of oversight of state actions, including standards-setting and permitting, and 
through the administration of a Mississippi River basin nutrient-trading program.46 A pollution 
trading program would allocate required reductions among point sources, and then permit trading 
among both point sources and non-point sources as an alternative means of achieving them. 
In envisioning such a system, assume that a 30% reduction from point sources is feasible. 
Given that point sources only comprise an estimated 10% of the nutrient problem, this would 
only result in a 3% reduction in Gulf of Mexico nutrient loading. However, consider a system 
where point sources could trade with nonpoint sources at a 10:1 ratio (for trading purposes, ten 
units of nonpoint source reduction would be equal to 1 unit of point source reduction). Under 
such a system, if we assume that nonpoint source reductions would be substantially less 
expensive than point source reductions in most cases, then the 30% reduction target would nearly 
be achieved. At least two conditions should be placed on such trades. First, the point source 
would have to be able to continue to discharge without causing or contributing to a local 
violation of water quality standards. Second, any trading with non-point sources would have to 
include sufficient assurances that reductions would be achieved. Ideally, such trading agreements 
should explicitly provide that any citizen with standing to sue the point source discharger itself 
under the Clean Water Act would constitute an intended, third-party beneficiary of the 
45 See 33 U.S.C. §1313(d) (2000).
46 See U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUE PRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Washington, D.C. 
(2004) at 495 (endorsing pollution trading as a strategy to reduce nutrients in ocean waters).
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contractual agreement through which the pollutant trade was conducted. Thus, if the non-point 
source project were not implemented within a reasonable time, citizens could sue the point 
source (and not the non-point source) both to enforce the contract and to correct a violation 
pursuant to section 505 of the Act.47 However, as long as the non-point source reduction project 
was faithfully implemented, the point source should not be vulnerable to suit, even if the 
anticipated reductions were not actually achieved.
Such a federal, interstate TMDL would be unprecedented. While EPA has developed 
interstate TMDLs in a few instances, including a TMDL for dioxin in the Columbia River Basin 
restricting industrial discharges of the pollutant in Oregon, Washington and Idaho,48 an interstate 
TMDL for the Mississippi River basin would far exceed any interstate TMDL effort undertaken 
to date by the agency. Such a TMDL would cover thousands of pollution sources within 
territories covering 31 states - or a land area constituting 41% of the continental United States. A 
federal nutrient pollution trading framework for the Mississippi River basin would also be 
unprecedented.49 Most, if not all, of the nutrient pollution trading programs to date have been 
much smaller-scale and relatively ineffective.50 However, a Mississippi River basin trading 
program, implemented on the federal level, might have a better chance at success than these 
47
 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
48 See, e.g., Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995); See also EPA Region 4 TMDL 
web site (containing information on the Coosa River Basin TMDL in Alabama and Georgia),  at 
http://www.epa.gov/region4/water/tmdl/alabama/#coosa; and EPA Region 3 TMDL web site (containing 
information on a TMDL for the Christina Basin in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware), at
http://www.epa.gov/reg3wapd/christina/pdf/execsumm.pdf.
49 See Ann Powers, The Current Controversy Regarding TMDLs: Contemporary Perspectives, “TMDLs and 
Pollutant Trading,”  4 RES COMMUNES: VT.’S J. ENV’T 2 (2002-2003) (Discussing various pollution trading 
programs, including a useful appendix of “well-known water quality trading programs,” all of which could be 
accurately described as relatively small-scale and ineffective in that little pollution trading has actually occurred 
under the programs).
50 See Id.
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programs due to the size of the “market” for trades and coordination through a central 
authority.51 Such a program could effectively give point sources a market incentive to identify 
and implement cost-effective reductions in the agricultural non-point source loading that is 
primarily responsible for Gulf hypoxia. Oversight of state- level implementation could 
conceivably include allocation of total permissible loads to each state.52 States would be required 
to modify their water quality standards and permitting practices accordingly to limit nutrient 
discharges. Such a state-by-state system of setting nutrient standards based on both intrastate 
conditions and interstate pollution concerns might be more palatable to EPA than federal 
promulgation of uniform, basin-wide water quality standards for nutrients in all Mississippi 
River basin states – a concept recently proposed to the EPA in a petition for rulemaking 
submitted by the Ozark Chapter of the Sierra Club, and rejected by the agency in June 2004.53
D. The Five Practical and Legal Challenges Presented by Gulf Hypoxia 
From both the standpoints of practical and legal analyses, hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico 
presents a mammoth environmental challenge.  Five aspects of Gulf hypoxia make it uniquely 
difficult to address. First, Gulf hypoxia is a challenge because the adverse impacts often occur in 
locations far distant from the source of the pollutants. The nutrient pollution that causes the 
problem is transported great distances through freshwater rivers, becoming disproportionately 
51
 One variable which could conceivably “shrink the market” for trades is found in the Farm Bill programs 
allocating funding under programs such as the Conservation Reserve and Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP). If funding under these programs expanded considerably enough, there could conceivably be little demand 
left for non-point source reduction projects on agricultural lands.
52 See text accompanying notes 109 to 112. Normally, states develop TMDLs and then implement point source 
reductions through their permitting programs. However a federal, interstate TMDL would likely set limits for each 
state and require the states to meet such reductions. 
53 See EPA Response to Sierra Club Petition Regarding Defined Portions of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers 
(June, 2004) at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/sierra-supp.pdf.
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more biologically available to support primary production upon reaching the affected ocean 
waters.54 Approximately 90% of the nitrate load transported to the Gulf is believed to stem from 
sources upstream of the confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.55  Because these states 
are not directly adversely affected by Gulf hypoxia, they may have little incentive to incur the 
costs associated both with administration of the regime and implementation of pollution 
reductions.
Second, a myriad of point and non-point sources of nutrients are the c ause of Gulf 
hypoxia. As such, any one source is inevitably “insignificant” when viewed only as a single 
source.  While estimates vary, approximately ninety percent of the pollution load causing 
hypoxia is believed to result from non-point sources. 56  The remainder is contributed by point 
sources including an estimated 12,400 sewage treatment plants and 3,900 industrial nutrient 
dischargers.57
Third, the adverse impacts to the Gulf ecosystem are hard to quantify for purposes of 
cost/benefit analysis, making it difficult to determine the most “economically efficient” level of 
investment in a pollution control regime. Brown shrimp yields, measured in terms of catch per 
unit effort, have been trending down since the seventies; with the overall (dollar) yield also 
trending down since a record high in 1990.58  Other than these trends for the shrimp fishery, 
54 See Id. quoting and citing Alexander, R.B. et al. Effect of stream channel size on the delivery of nitrogen to the 
Gulf of Mexico, NATURE 403 (2001) at 758-761 (concluding that over 90% of the nitrate that reaches the Mississippi 
River is transported downstream to the Gulf of Mexico).
55 Id. See also, ACTION PLAN, supra note 5, at 8.
56 See INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 3. 
57
 Mary L. Belefeski & Larinda Tervelt Norton, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: A Historical and Policy Perspective, 
12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 349 (1999).
58 See US NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES, AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF  HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO (2000) at 25.
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there is relatively little quantified evidence of adverse impacts to the Gulf fishing industry.59  The 
most serious concern involves the risk of a “collapse” of the Gulf’s $2.8 billion fishery in the 
future,60 such as has occurred in Eastern Europe’s Black Sea,61 and in the North Sea (separating 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden) in 1979.62  Such an ecosystem collapse could occur as a result of 
the synergistic effect of hypoxia and growing fishing pressure. For example, hypoxia can “herd” 
commercial species into areas with higher oxygen levels along the edge of a hypoxic zone.63
Concentrated fishing efforts along this edge can thus produce large yields of seafood in the short 
term, depleting fish stocks to dangerously low levels in the process. Obviously, a collapse of 
Gulf of Mexico fisheries would be extremely hard to reverse.64
Fourth, science suggests that any reductions that are implemented today may not 
consistently yield higher oxygen levels in the Gulf of Mexico for many years. There is often a 
delay of a decade or more between the increased or decreased inputs of nitrogen fertilizers and 
the ecological response of increased or decreased dissolved oxygen levels in coastal waters.65
This is, in part, due to the fact that many agricultural lands are “saturated” with nutrients from 
past and ongoing fertilizer use.66
59 See Belefeski, supra Note 57, at 338.
60 See INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 7.
61
 Downing, J.A., J.L. Baker, R.J. Diaz, T. Prato, N.N. Rabalais, R.J. Zimmerman, GULF OF MEXICO HYPOXIA: 
LAND AND SEA INTERACTIONS: COUNCIL FOR AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE REPORT
(1999).
62
 See Raloff, supra note 1.
63 Id.
64
 Id.; See also MARK MURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (Penguin Books 
1997) (discussing depletion of cod fish stocks and various successes and failures in restoring stocks over time).
65 Id.; See also Mark Clayton, Dead Zones Threaten Fisheries, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 27, 2004.
66 See Belefeski, supra note 57, at 346. 
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Fifth, and finally, Gulf hypoxia occurs primarily in waters that are more than three miles 
seaward of the shoreline and thus beyond the reach of the “territorial seas” as defined by the 
Clean Water Act.67 Thus, the problem waters are found mostly in an area of exclusively federal 
jurisdiction, beggaring analysis under the “cooperative federalism” framework of the Clean 
Water Act.68 The geographic location of Gulf hypoxia, together with the Clean Water Act’s 
inconsistency with general U.S. jurisdiction over its marine waters, collectively raise difficult 
questions regarding which CWA provisions apply to the affected waters. 
II. A Legal Analysis of Gulf Hypoxia
A. The Clean Water Act
The over-arching goal of the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) is to “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”69 The CWA 
prohibits all point source discharges of pollution unless they are permitted pursuant to its 
requirements.70 While the Act created a system of pollution controls that has often been 
described as “comprehensive,”71 Gulf hypoxia has effectively eluded the Act’s carefully 
constructed system of regulatory controls.
67
 While the Clean Water Act just uses the term “mile” - a distance which, when used to refer to distances on land, 
refers to a distance equal to 1.609 kilometers, this note assumes that the term “mile” as used in the Act means 
“nautical mile.” A “nautical mile” – also called a “geographic mile” – is a distance which is equal to 1.852 
kilometers. See RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, REVISED EDITION (1988). Likewise, whenever this note 
uses the term mile, the term “nautical mile” is intended.
68
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1386 (2000).
69
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
70
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
71 See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 179 (2001) 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). (“The shift in the focus of federal water regulation from protecting navigability toward 
environmental protection reached a dramatic climax in 1972, with the passage of the CWA. The Act, which was 
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In order to effectively harness the CWA’s regulatory provisions to reach the upstream 
sources of pollution that impair the Gulf, the following steps are required. First, some ambient 
standards must apply to the affected waters that can be invoked to require regulation of upstream 
sources. Second, hypoxia must constitute a violation of the applicable ambient standards. Third, 
a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) - or other mechanism for creating a “pollution budget” -
must quantify upstream loads and prescribe necessary reductions. Fourth, the TMDL (or other 
mechanism) must be implemented to reduce pollution from distant upstream sources. 
The first step in this analysis is to ascertain which, if any, ambient standards apply to the 
affected Gulf of Mexico waters, and to determine whether any such applicable standards may 
form the legal basis for a regulatory pollution control regime. The Act creates four systems of 
often overlapping standards, which may be applicable in limiting point source discharges 
through one of two permitting systems: the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) created by section 402,72 or the “dredged or fill material” permitting program created 
by section 404.73 The primary ambient standards in the Act are the water quality standards of 
section 303.74 In addition, the Act contains ocean discharge criteria (section 403(c))75 and 
passed as an amendment to the existing FWPCA, was universally described by its supporters as the first truly 
comprehensive federal water pollution legislation. The ‘major purpose’ of the CWA was ‘to establish a 
comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution.’ S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 95 (1971), 2 
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the 
Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 1511 (1971)(emphasis added). 
And ‘[n]o Congressman's remarks on the legislation were complete without reference to [its] 'comprehensive' nature 
...." Milwaukee v. Illinois [citation omitted].”) 
72
 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
73
 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
74
 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
75
 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
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guidelines for the discharge of dredge or fill material (section 404(b)(1)).76 These section 
404(b)(1) guidelines are clearly only applicable to “section 404” permits, and thus cannot be 
harnessed to reach upstream and regulate distant sources of pollution.77 Finally, the Act contains 
technology-based effluent limits (sections 301, 304(b) and 306) which are established for 
dischargers without consideration of ambient water quality.78 Thus, the section 303 water quality 
standards and the section 403 ocean discharge criteria comprise the two sets of standards in the 
Act that could form the basis for regulatory controls of NPDES- permitted discharges upstream. 
The question of court deference to agency interpretations of statutes: the Chevron analysis.
The analyses of EPA authority under sections 303 and 403 of the Clean Water Act must 
proceed pursuant to the analytical framework created by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council. 79 In Chevron, the Court set out a two-step analytical process 
that applies when a court reviews an agency interpretation of a “statute which it administers.”80
This “Chevron two- step” is to proceed as follows: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
76
 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2000).
77 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (containing the US EPA’s 404(b)(1) guidelines). These guidelines are clearly focused on 
the criteria to be used to guide individual permitting decisions. Because the subsection 404(b)(1) guidelines are 
applicable only to the issuance of “Section 404” permits, and do not set quality standards for ambient waters, these 
guidelines may not be used to control 402 discharges. However, section 404 permitted discharges are not to cause or 
contribute to water quality standards violations, though state certification of a project under section 401 of the CWA 
is considered conclusive on this matter. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(d), See also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 
822, 834 (9th Cir. 1986).
78
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1314(b), 1316 (2000).
79 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80 Id. at 842.
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addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”81
If the Congress did not speak to the precise question at issue, the delegation to the agency may 
be either explicit or implicit: in either case, a court is to extend deference to the agency 
interpretation as long as it is a reasonable one.82
The Ocean Discharge Criteria of section 403.
Section 403(a) states “no discharge under section 1342 [§ 402] of this title for a 
discharge into the territorial sea, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the oceans shall be 
issued, after promulgation of guidelines established under subsection (c) of this section, except in 
compliance with such guidelines.”83 Particularly in light of the broad definition of “the oceans” 
in section 502(10) to include “any portion of the high seas beyond the contiguous zone,”84 the 
ocean discharge criteria of section 403 clearly apply to all marine waters over which the United 
States exercises jurisdiction, and even extend into international waters for an indeterminate 
distance. The line of U.S. jurisdiction over surrounding ocean waters is now established by the 
81 Id. at 842-843.
82 Id. at 843-844. (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”)
83
 33 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
84
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(10) (2000). 
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U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as a band of the seas extending two hundred miles from 
shore.85
Section 403(c) is generally entitled “Guidelines for determining degradation of waters.”86
Pursuant to subsection 403(a), these guidelines are to be applied in the issuance of NPDES 
permits authorizing point source discharges to ocean waters. Subsection 403(c) itself, however, 
does not contain any language expressly limiting the ocean discharge criteria to discharges 
directly to the waters listed in 403(a).87 Subsection 403(c) is, in fact, silent on this subject. This 
silence is properly interpreted as an implicit delegation of authority to the EPA under the 
Chevron analytical framework. While the very title of section 403, stating simply “ocean 
discharge criteria,” may be read as implicitly limiting the section to discharges directly to ocean 
waters, such an interpretation is certainly not the only reasonable way to read the statute. 88
While legislative history establishes that regulation of such discharges directly to ocean waters 
was, at least, the intended focus of this section,89 the legislative history does not suggest that this 
is the only permissible application of the subsection 403(c) criteria. Thus, the remaining question 
85
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, art. 57, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) 
(Hereinafter, UNCLOS); see also Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983) (establishing 200 
mile EEZ).
86
 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c) (2000).
87 Id.
88 See Robin Kundis Craig & Sarah Miller, Ocean Discharge Criteria and Marine Protected Areas: Ocean Water 
Quality Protection Under the Clean Water Act, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2001) (Analyzing Section 
403 and concluding that, because section 403 and the water quality standards provisions of section 303 both apply to 
the territorial seas, that these sections, “cannot be treated as regulatory equivalents,” and noting that “because the 
TMDL provisions, section 302, and the interstate provisions all refer to ‘water quality standards’ alone, these 
provisions do not automatically apply in the contiguous zone and the ocean when EPA establishes ocean discharge 
criteria for those water bodies.”).
89 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3740. (“The disposal of pollutants into ocean waters is 
regulated under this bill when it involves a discharge from any outfall beyond the shoreline of the United States or 
any discharge into the territorial sea from a vessel.”)
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under Chevron is whether or not an EPA interpretation of sections 403 and 301(b)(1)(C) would 
constitute a reasonable exercise of agency authority to fill a “gap” left by the statute.
The plain statutory language of subsection 403(c), read in light of the overall goals of the 
Act, may reasonably be interpreted to delegate authority to the EPA to invoke its 403(c) criteria 
as a basis for regulation of upstream discharges. In light of the aggressive goal of the Clean 
Water Act to “restore and maintain…the Nation’s waters,”90 this interpretation would clearly be 
consistent with the purposes of the Act. Furthermore, the language of section 301(b)(1)(c), 
requiring all pollution discharges to comply, not only with the water quality standards 
provisions, but also with “any other federal law or regulation,” is very reasonably read to 
incorporate the subsection 403(c) ocean discharge criteria. After all, by its plain language, the 
phrase “any other federal law or regulation” reaches outside of the CWA. As such, it would be 
imminently reasonable for the agency to conclude that this section also may link up with another 
section of the same statute.
Finally, any such EPA decision to set federal water quality standards under section 403 
would be particularly reasonable in light of the considerable expansion of U.S. jurisdiction over 
its adjacent marine waters since the Clean Water Act passed in 1972. While the provisions of the 
CWA regarding marine waters made sense in 1972, they make little sense today in light of this 
jurisdictional expansion. When the Clean Water Act passed Congress, waters beyond three miles 
from shore were considered part of “high seas.”91 The U.S. assertion of exclusive economic 
rights to waters extending to 200 miles into the ocean (including exclusive fishing rights) make 
90
 33 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
91See OCEAN BLUE PRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 46, at 73.
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these waters no longer a part of the “global commons.”92  The waters of the EEZ are now clearly 
a part of “the Nation’s waters,” and it would be imminently reasonable for the EPA to exercise 
an implicitly delegated authority to provide for their stewardship through the promulgation and 
implementation of federal water quality standards.
Despite these arguments, the EPA has thus far only applied Section 403(c) to direct 
discharges to ocean waters. 93  In 1980, the EPA adopted ocean discharge regulations which are 
clearly applicable only to discharges directly to ocean waters.94 The EPA recently considered the 
creation of new, section 403 ocean discharge criteria that would function more like water quality 
standards. 95 Called “healthy ocean waters,” these proposed “hybrid” standards, as informally 
proposed, were also clearly limited to direct discharges to ocean waters, applying within the band 
of seas between 3 and 200 miles from shore.96 The three-mile inner limit corresponded with the 
reach of state jurisdiction under the CWA in light of the Act’s concerns regarding federalism and 
preservation of state authority.97 The outermost limit was also reasonable, corresponding with the 
outer limit of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. EPA informally considered these standards in 
response to President Clinton’s May 26, 2000, Executive Order No. 13158 for Marine Protected 
92 See 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000) (“Except as provided in section 1812 of this title, the United States claims, and will 
exercise in the manner provided for in this chapter, sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority 
over all fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the exclusive economic zone.”)
93 See 45 Fed. Reg. 65953 (Oct. 3, 1980); 40 C. F. R. §§ 125.120-125.12.
94 Id.
95
 US EPA, Ocean Discharge Criteria: Revisions to Ocean Discharge Regulations, 40 C.F.R. Parts 122, 123 and 
125 (Copy of proposal on file with the author); see also Public Hearing Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 42936-01 (July 12, 
2000); See also Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 29 (summarizing the EPA proposal).
96 See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 29.
97 But see, Id. at 30 (arguing compellingly that EPA’s rule effectively limiting the application of section 403 to the 
exclusively federal waters constituted a violation of the statute). In light of this concern, a more reasonable solution 
would have been to create two different sets of section 403 regulations, applying essentially the current 403 
standards to state waters, and applying the strengthened standards only to the exclusively federal waters as proposed.
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Areas.98 While the Bush administration has kept this executive order in place,99 the EPA has not 
again proposed strengthened section 403 standards.
The EPA should proceed with adoption of strengthened section 403 standards for all U.S. 
ocean waters. Because subsection 403(c) is not properly viewed as imprisoned within the section 
of the statute within which it is housed, this section, particularly when linked with section 
301(b)(1)(C), reaches well beyond the requirements of subsection 403(a). Thus, EPA should also 
explicitly provide that these standards may be invoked, at the agency’s discretion, in order to 
regulate land-based sources of pollution upstream. 
The Water Quality Standards provisions of section 303.
Water quality standards are defined in the Act as consisting of “designated uses of the 
navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such 
uses.”100 The EPA considers an antidegradation policy to also constitute an element of water 
quality standards.101 Water quality standards must be established by the states and approved by 
the EPA, with disapproval triggering a mandatory duty for the EPA to promulgate federal 
standards.102  States are to establish “fishable and swimmable” use classifications for their waters 
consistent with the section 101(a)(2) goals of the Act that “wherever attainable, an interim goal 
of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife 
98
 Exec. Order No. 13,158, 65 Fed. Reg. at 34,911 (May 26, 2000) (mandating that the EPA, “relying upon existing 
Clean Water Act authorities, shall expeditiously propose new science-based regulations, as necessary, to ensure 
appropriate levels of protection for the marine environment.”).
99
 See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 7, citing to a Press Release, Donald. L. Evans, Secretary of Commerce.
100
 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000).
101 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12; 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000). 
102 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(a) to 1313(c) (2000).
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and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983.”103 Specific water 
quality criteria for each use classification are set with the support of “information and 
guidelines” developed by the U.S. EPA under section 304(a).104 EPA may cite its 304(a) criteria 
as a basis for disapproving state-established criteria.105 States are required to consider revision of 
their standards at least once every three years, holding public hearings for this purpose.106 This 
standards review process is often referred to as the “triennial review” of water quality standards; 
however, states frequently allow more than three years to elapse without conducting the required 
triennial reviews.107
Where water quality standards are not met, the Act requires the states and the EPA to 
develop Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) to restore ambient conditions to levels meeting 
or exceeding applicable standards.108 A TMDL is essentially a “pollution budget” for a particular 
pollutant that is causing a water body to violate its applicable water quality standards.109 A 
TMDL is comprised of a Waste Load Allocation (WLA) for all point sources, a Load Allocation 
(LA) for all nonpoint sources, and a margin of safety.110  Generally, the states and tribes develop 
103
 33 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(2) (2000). See also US EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, SECOND EDITION
(EPA, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/handbook/.
104
 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000).
105 See Mississippi Commission on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980) (Upholding EPA's 
disapproval of Mississippi’s state water quality criteria for dissolved oxygen based in part on the inconsistency of 
Mississippi’s criteria with EPA’s 304(a) criteria).
106 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (2000); 40 C.F.R § 131.20.
107 See River Network’s Clean Water Act website at www.rivernetwork.org.
108 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000).
109 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000); 40 CFR § 131.
110 See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7; See also EPA TMDL Website at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/.
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TMDLs subject to EPA approval or disapproval. TMDLs are pollutant-specific and apply to all 
sources of a problem pollutant contributing to a violation, including nonpoint sources.111
The water quality standards analysis of Gulf hypoxia encounters trouble at step one: it is 
not clear whether water quality standards apply at all to most of the waters affected by Gulf 
hypoxia. The CWA concerns itself with the integrity of “the Nations waters,”112 and proceeds to 
divide these waters into three categories: 1) the “navigable waters” (which includes the 
“territorial seas”), 113 2) the “contiguous zone,”114 and 3) “the oceans.”115 At the time the CWA 
was enacted, as is generally the case today, states had jurisdiction over a band of the seas 
extending three miles from the shoreline.116 The Clean Water Act likewise defines the territorial 
seas as “the belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of 
the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of 
inland waters, and extending a seaward distance of three miles.”117 Section 303(c), in turn, 
requires the states to set water quality standards for its waters, referring to “the navigable waters 
111 See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that TMDLs are to be developed for waters 
impaired exclusively by nonpoint sources).
112
 33 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (2000).
113
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (defining the term “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including 
the territorial seas.”).
114
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (2000).
115
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(10) (2000).
116 See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C § 1312 (“The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is 
approved and confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line.”) but see U. S. v. Florida, 425 
U.S. 791, 792 (1976) (holding that Florida possesses expanded maritime jurisdiction: “As against the United States, 
the State of Florida is entitled to all the lands, minerals, and other natural resources underlying the Gulf of Mexico 
extending seaward for a distance of 3 marine leagues from its coastline or its historic coastline, whichever is 
landward, but for not less than 3 geographic miles from its coastline”); see also U.S. v. States of La., Tex., Miss., 
Ala. and Fla., 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (also holding that the Submerged Lands Act granted to Texas the submerged lands 
in the Gulf of Mexico within three marine leagues from her coast, but that the Act did not grant Louisiana, 
Mississippi or Alabama any rights in submerged lands beyond three geographic miles from their coasts.).
117 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2001).
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involved.”118  As discussed in more detail below, while section 303’s use of this phrase does not 
expressly limit the application of water quality standards to these waters, the clear implication of 
this section’s silence regarding “the oceans” and “the contiguous zone” is that water quality 
standards are indeed confined to the “navigable waters” as that term is defined in the Act. 
While the water quality standards provisions of sections 303 do not appear to reach 
beyond “the navigable waters,” this section does provide the most promising statutory source of 
authority for a regulatory regime to address that portion of Gulf hypoxia that occurs within the 
navigable waters. Federal regulations require point source discharges to comply with “the 
applicable water quality requirements of all affected States.”119 Thus, if a portion of Gulf 
hypoxia occurs within the “navigable waters” in the State of Louisiana, a regulatory regime 
could be based upon the violation of water quality standards in these waters. 
Water Quality Standards Analysis of Gulf hypoxia in Louisiana Jurisdictional Waters.
The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) has established water 
quality standards for the coastal waters within its jurisdiction.120 Louisiana's dissolved oxygen 
criteria establish enforceable numeric standards of 4 mg/l in estuarine waters and 5 mg/l in 
coastal waters “except when natural conditions cause this value to be lower.”121 LDEQ has also 
118 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c)(2)(A) & 1313(c)(4) (2001).
119 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d); See also, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (upholding 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d)).
120 See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 1123(C)(3) (April, 2005) (Louisiana classifies “Atchafalaya Bay & Delta and 
Gulf Waters to the State Three-Mile Limit” and “Mississippi River Basin Costal Bays and Gulf Waters to the State 
Three-Mile Limit” with the following four use classifications: Primary Contact Recreation; Secondary Contact 
Recreation; Propagation of Fish and Wildlife; & Oyster Propagation.”), available at 
http://www.deq.state.la.us/planning/regs/title33/33v09.pdf.
121 See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 1113(C)(3)(c) (April, 2005).
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adopted a narrative nutrient criterion for its waters. 122 Unfortunately, however, this standard is 
rather toothless. 
Although Gulf hypoxia (DO levels < 2 mg/l) would appear to clearly constitute a 
violation of Louisiana’s dissolved oxygen criteria,123 neither the State of Louisiana nor the EPA 
has found that a portion of the Gulf hypoxic area occurs in Louisiana jurisdictional waters. 
Despite compelling evidence that a portion of Gulf hypoxia does extend into Louisiana waters,124
LDEQ has not listed any of its coastal waters as impaired,125 nor has the EPA disapproved the 
state list and promulgated a federal 303(d) list recognizing the impairment of these waters.126 In 
fact, LDEQ staff believe that low dissolved oxygen conditions in portions of Louisiana marine 
waters are either improving, or are distinct from Gulf hypoxia.127 Thus, the State of Louisiana
122 See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § 1113(B)8 (April, 2005) (“The naturally occurring range of nitrogen-phosphorous ratios shall be 
maintained. This range shall not apply to designated intermittent streams. To establish the appropriate range of ratios and compensate 
for natural seasonal fluctuations, the administrative authority will use site-specific studies to establish limits for nutrients. Nutrient 
concentrations that produce aquatic growth to the extent that it creates a public nuisance or interferes with designated water uses shall 
not be added to any surface waters.”).
123
 One explanation for how a 4 or 5mg/l DO water quality criterion could theoretically coexist with hypoxia without 
it being recognized as a violation is provided by the possibility that the standards only require monitoring for 
dissolved oxygen levels near the surface. This illustrates the importance of insuring that dissolved oxygen standards 
explicitly apply throughout the water column and that monitoring be conducted at depth.
124
 This argument is based upon unpublished water quality data (provided by Dr. Nancy Rabalais, on file with the 
author) and personal communications with Dr. Nancy Rabalais.
125
 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Final 2004 303(d) List, available at 
http://www.deq.state.la.us/technology/tmdl/TMDL%202004IRCat%205_revised0604.pdf.
126 See Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) web site at 
http://www.deq.state.la.us/planning/wqireports/2004wqireports.htm (last visited, April 3, 2005). According to the 
(LDEQ) web site, The final 2004 303(d) list was submitted to the US EPA for approval on October 19, 2004; and 
EPA has yet to approve or disapprove this list. 
127
 An E-mail from Dugan Sabins, LDEQ to Brad McLane, dated May 18, 2005, stated as follows: “Louisiana 
currently lists subsegment 050901 – Mermentau River Basin Coastal Bays and Gulf Waters to State three-mile limit 
as being impaired by low dissolved oxygen. However, Louisiana’s ambient water quality monitoring network 
sampled this subsegment and found the dissolved oxygen criterion was being met.  Due to documented presence of 
some hypoxic conditions during recent shelf wide summer hypoxia monitoring, Louisiana elected to include this 
subsegment as impaired for low dissolved oxygen. Research on the hypoxic zone issue has indicated that most of the 
zone is outside of Louisiana jurisdictional waters; therefore, with the exception of 050901 the zone does not need to 
be considered on Louisiana’s §303(d) List. While some estuarine waters within Louisiana are listed for low 
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and the EPA have not yet found that Gulf hypoxia occurs in Louisiana jurisdictional waters. As 
such, Louisiana is not in a strong position to complain about pollution discharges in upstream 
states.
In light of the legal and practical importance of determining whether or not hypoxia 
extends into Louisiana jurisdictional waters, the Louisiana DEQ, EPA, and stakeholders, should 
carefully consider whether Lousiana waters should be listed on the state’s 303(d) list due to 
hypoxia.128 At the same time, it would be appropriate for Louisiana to review its water quality 
standards.129 Particularly if hypoxia is found to occur in Louisiana waters, LDEQ should 
consider developing numeric nitrogen and phosphorus criteria and reevaluate the dissolved 
oxygen criteria applicable to its marine waters.130 The combination of the adoption of stronger 
water quality standards, and official recognition of hypoxia as an ambient condition which 
violates those standards, would place LDEQ and the EPA in a stronger position to challenge 
pollution discharges in upstream states. 
Beyond the “navigable waters:” do sections 303 and 304(a) grant EPA authority to set standards 
for Gulf hypoxia occurring in waters beyond the territorial seas?
Turning now to consider the applicability of the water quality standards sections of the Act 
beyond the territorial seas, the following three questions are presented. First, does Section 304(a) 
dissolved oxygen, the sources of these impairments are not related to the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone. This 
assessment is expected to remain the same for Louisiana’s 2006 §303(d) List.”
128
 If EPA believes that hypoxia occurs in Louisiana waters, despite an LDEQ determination to the contrary, EPA 
could disapprove LDEQ’s 2004 303(d) list and promulgate an expanded list with Gulf hypoxia affected waters 
included.
129
 Louisiana completed its last “triennial review” in 1999. See River Network web site at
http://www.rivernetwork.org/cleanwater/cwa_search.asp. 
130
see US EPA, AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED OXYGEN (SALTWATER): CAPE COD TO CAPE 
HATTERAS (2000) (providing an example of marine dissolved oxygen criteria published by EPA pursuant to section 
304(a) of the CWA).
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of the Clean Water Act give EPA independent authority to set enforceable water quality criteria
for exclusively federal marine waters? Second, does the Act’s silence in Section 303(c) regarding 
the EPA Administrator’s authority to set water quality standards for exclusively federal waters, 
read in light of the statute as a whole, constitute a “plain language” limitation on EPA authority: 
or, does this Congressional silence constitute a delegation of discretionary authority to the 
Administrator to set federal water quality standards for these waters? Third, even if the statute 
was clear at the time of its passage, has evolving international law implicitly amended the Clean 
Water Act’s definitions of the “contiguous zone” and/or the “territorial seas,” thereby expanding
the EPA’s delegation of authority under the statute? These questions are answered in reverse 
order, keeping in mind the Chevron analytical framework.
Has evolving international law effectively amended the Clean Water Act?
At the time of the CWA’s passage, there was a nice consistency between the extent of U.S. 
jurisdiction over the seas, the extent of state jurisdiction over the seas, and the CWA’s definition 
of the territorial seas: all three extended three miles from shore.131 While the CWA’s definition 
of the territorial sea has not changed since 1972, this jurisdictional line has changed considerably 
since then as a function of the evolution of international law. Thus, the U.S. territorial seas now 
extend 12 nautical miles from shore.132 Likewise, the CWA’s definition of the contiguous zone 
131 See 43 U.S.C § 1312 (“The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is approved and confirmed as a line 
three geographical miles distant from its coast line.”); See also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2000)
 (CWA definition of territorial seas); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606 (stating that states may claim sovereignty over a band of the territorial sea extending three 
miles from the baseline); See also U.S. v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 8 (1997) (discussing the 3 mile extent of the U.S. 
territorial seas prior to the extension of the U.S. territorial seas to 12 miles pursuant to Proclamation 5928.). 
132 See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)(stating that “Every state has the right to 
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles.”); See also Proclamation No. 
5928, Territorial Sea of the United States of America, 54 Fed. Reg. 777. (December 27, 1988) (extending the US 
territorial sea “to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with 
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remains unchanged, while as a matter of international law, the contiguous zone now extends 24 
nautical miles seaward.133 These changes destroy the formerly existing, carefully-crafted 
coherence of the Clean Water Act’s structure,134 begging the question of how to match up these 
newly-created “exclusive federal” waters with the various provisions of the Act.135
There is a compelling argument that the evolution of international law has resulted in a 
modification of the CWA’s definition of the contiguous zone, because the Act’s definition of that 
term is itself based on international law.136 The practical effect of such a definitional change 
would be relevant to only three sections of the Clean Water Act. First, the modification could 
expand the waters to which a waiver of secondary treatment standards for sewage discharges to 
the oceans may be secured under section 301(h),137 likely having no practical effect on the 
implementation of the law. Second, the requirement that “any vessel of the Armed Forces subject 
to the regulations [promulgated by the Secretary of Defense, operating] in the navigable waters 
international law,” and noting that nothing in it “extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any 
jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom.”). 
133 See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, art. 33(2), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (“The contiguous zone may not extend 
beyond 24 nautical miles from the baslines from which the breadth of the territorial seas is measured”); See also, 64
Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (Executive Order of President Clinton expanding the contiguous zone to 24 miles).
134 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3743 (“The Committee has added definitions of the 
terms territorial seas, contiguous zone, and ocean to describe clearly the jurisdictional limits of the Act, and provide 
a basis for its relationship to other laws of the United States as well as to international law.”).
135
 While this note uses the term “exclusively federal” waters as a shorthand term to refer to the band of the seas 
extending between three and two hundred nautical miles from shore, it should be noted that Texas and Florida have 
general jurisdiction over a 12 mile band of seas extending into the Gulf. See note 116. However, these states still 
have only a three mile jurisdiction over these waters for purposes of the CWA.
136 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (2000) (Defining the contiguous zone as “the entire zone established or to be established by the United 
States under Article 24 of the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous zone.”); See also Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606 (defining the contiguous zone as “a zone of the high seas contiguous to 
its territorial sea…The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.”); Also see 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (expanding US contiguous zone pursuant to UNCLOS).
137
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (2001) (“For the purposes of this subsection the phrase ‘the discharge of any pollutant into 
marine waters’ refers to a discharge into deep waters of the territorial seas or the waters of the contiguous zone,...”).
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of the United States or the waters of the contiguous zone [must be] equipped with any required 
marine pollution control device meeting standards established under this subsection…” would 
apply to this larger band of waters.138 Third, and most importantly, section 311 regarding “Oil 
and hazardous substances liability” would apply within this expanded band of waters.139
With respect to the territorial seas, however, any argument that the expansion of this band 
of seas as a matter of international law has likewise expanded the term as defined in the Clean 
Water Act is tenuous at best. The CWA expressly defines the territorial seas as a “belt of the 
seas…extending seaward a distance of three miles” without reference to international law.140 The 
fact that the contiguous zone is defined by reference to international law, while the territorial 
seas are defined explicitly in a manner corresponding with the extent of state jurisdiction over 
marine waters, suggests that this term was defined less with international law in mind.
In summary, while the evolution of international law expanding the contiguous zone may 
have modified the Act’s definition of this term, the expansion of the “territorial seas” has clearly 
not changed this term as defined in the CWA. 
Interpreting Congressional silence in Section 303: “plain language” or an “implicit delegation of 
authority”?
Section 303 of the CWA is silent with respect to those waters beyond the “navigable 
waters.” Does this silence, read in light of the Act as a whole, mean that the EPA may set 
exclusively federal standards for these waters, or does it mean that Congress intended section 
138
 33 U.S.C. § 1322 (2001).
139 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2001).
140 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (2001).
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303 to apply exclusively to the navigable waters, with sections 403 (ocean discharges) and 311 
(oil and hazardous substances liability) providing the only means for ensuring the stewardship of 
more distant ocean waters? This presents a close question, and it should be noted that a court 
could easily find the statutes silence to constitute either ambiguity (thus inviting the agency to 
“fill the gap” left by the statute) or a clear limit on EPA authority. The best answer to this 
question, however, is that the section’s references to the navigable waters, combined with its 
silence regarding the contiguous zone and the oceans, constitutes a plain language limitation on 
the agency’s authority under Section 303. In Russello v. U.S., the Supreme Court stated that 
“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act… it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally… in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”141
A counter argument to this conclusion may proceed as follows. 142 Congressional silence in 
section 303(c) should be considered in light of the purpose of the Clean Water Act to “restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The drafters 
of the Act considered it to be a “comprehensive” statute to that end, and the hole that exists 
absent federal establishment of water quality standards for exclusively federal waters is 
inconsistent with this understanding of the Act as “comprehensive.” Second, the CWA’s 
“cooperative federalism” structure is a product of Congressional concern that the Act should 
respect the states’ authorities to initially establish water quality standards for their waters, setting 
standards as stringent as desired, but not below minimally acceptable federal requirements. The 
very rationale for allowing states to set water quality standards first for waters within their 
141 Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
142 See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 34-36 ( Analyzing the Clean Water Act and reaching the conclusion 
that the EPA does have discretionary authority under the Act to set standards for these federal waters).
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jurisdiction is obviously absent in the practice of EPA setting federal standards for federal 
waters: such an activity clearly does not infringe in any way on state authority.
This line of analytical reasoning begs the question of why, if federalism was its sole 
concern, did Congress not explicitly grant the EPA the power to set water quality standard for 
the “contiguous zone” and “the oceans” as well? The most likely answer is that such an exercise 
of the United States Power would have been an extraterritorial assertion of authority that would 
have made little sense under international law as it existed at the time. Why would Congress 
have established water quality standards for the “high seas,” waters which were  beyond its 
territorial jurisdiction? This suggests that “ocean discharge criteria” attach more to the 
“discharges” themselves than to the “water s.” The U.S. clearly had jurisdiction to regulate 
discharges into these international waters, even it did not have jurisdiction over the waters
themselves. The U.S. could regulate such discharges by its nationals, as well as in any case 
where such discharge could cause a nuisance within the U.S. territorial waters.143 Today, 
however, the U.S. not only maintains exclusive jurisdiction over the territorial seas, its 
jurisdiction over the waters of the EEZ is likewise extremely broad. For these reasons, 
Congressional silence could be construed as an implicit delegation of authority to the EPA to set 
federal water quality standards for waters beyond the territorial seas.
Under Section 303(c)(4)(B), the EPA is charged with the duty to “promptly prepare and 
publish proposed water quality standards for the navigable waters… in any case where the 
Administrator determines that a revised or new standard is necessary to meet the requirements of 
143 See State of New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931) (holding as follows: “Defendant contends 
that, as it dumps the garbage into the ocean and not within the waters of the United States or of New Jersey, this 
Court is without jurisdiction to grant the injunction. But the defendant is before the Court and the property of 
plaintiff and its citizens that is alleged to have been injured by such dumping is within the Court's territorial 
jurisdiction. The situs of the acts creating the nuisance, whether within or without the United States, is of no 
importance.”)
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this chapter.” The reference to the “navigable waters” need not be read as words of limitation, 
but rather as words of description explaining the section’s provisions as they were to be applied 
in light of the snapshot of international law that Congress saw at the time it passed the CWA. 
Likewise, the preceding step of “disapproving” state standards before promulgating federal ones 
should not be viewed as the exclusive means of setting federal standards, but rather as a process 
informed by federalism concerns, concerns which are irrelevant to the analysis of setting federal 
standards for federal waters.
Despite these compelling, purpose-based arguments, the premise that section 303 reaches 
beyond the “navigable waters” is hard to reconcile with section 303’s use of that term. Because 
section 303 is silent regarding the contiguous zone and the oceans, if EPA has discretionary 
authority to set standards for these waters, such authority must be found either implicit within 
section 303(c), or must exist elsewhere in the statute. However, no other section of the Act may 
reasonably be read to grant the EPA the requisite authority to set standards for federal waters. 
While section 501(a) grants the EPA Administrator the authority to “prescribe such regulations 
as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter,”144 such a general grant of 
authority to promulgate regulations does not empower the Administrator to promulgate 
regulations exceeding the grant of authority provided in the statute. This leaves only section
304(a) as a possible independent basis for the EPA to adopt water quality standards for federal 
waters.
144
 33 U.S.C. § 1361 (2001).
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Section 304(a): an independent source of authority for setting federal criteria?
Under section 304(a), EPA is charged with the duty to develop federal “criteria” and 
“guidelines,” which have thus far been used exclusively both to guide states in setting water 
quality standards, and to guide the EPA in its review of such proposed standards. However, 
Congressional silence regarding the limits of section 304(a) could likewise be read as an implicit 
delegation of authority. The language of CWA section 304(a)(2)(A) clearly applies to all waters 
of the United States, including “the oceans.”145 Section 304(a)(1)(C) also clearly mandates the 
development of criteria regarding “the effects of pollutants on biological community diversity, 
productivity, and stability, including information on the factors affecting rates of eutrophication.” 
Under section 304(a)(1), EPA must “from time to time thereafter revise [such criteria] accurately 
reflecting the latest scientific knowledge.” EPA has not established such section 304(a)(1)
criteria for the Gulf, nor has it explicitly published any of its Gulf hypoxia studies under 
authority of section 304(a)(2) as “information” to guide the restoration of these waters.
In order to find a basis in law for the agency to change course and publish such 
“information” and/or “criteria” as enforceable standards, this section must be sufficiently 
ambiguous that it may reasonably be found to constitute an “implicit” delegation of authority. 
However, legislative history suggests that Congress intended this section only as a form of 
guidance, not as a basis for regulation. The Senate Report states as follows: “The development of 
information which describes the relationship of pollutants to water quality is essential for 
carrying out the objective of the Act. This information, known as criteria, is required under 
Section 304(a) to be developed and published by the Administrator and issued to the states and 
145 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2) (“The Administrator, after consultation..., shall develop and publish, within one year 
after October 18, 1972 (and from time to time thereafter revise) information (A) on the factors necessary to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of all navigable waters, ground waters, waters of the 
contiguous zone, and the oceans....”)
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public.”146  The combination of the structure of the Act, the legislative history, and the EPA’s 
long-followed practice of using this section only as an informational kind of section, suggests 
that it may not be invoked as a source of regulatory authority over federal waters. However, its 
use of the term “criteria” does present an argument to the contrary. To the extent that this section 
is ambiguous, an EPA interpretation of it as granting the agency authority to promulgate 
enforceable criteria for federal waters would likely constitute a “reasonable interpretation” 
entitled to deference from a court.147
Conclusion regarding ambient standards provisions of the Clean Water Act.
In conclusion, it is not clear whether sections 303 and 304(a) of the CWA  grant the EPA 
authority to set water quality standards for federal waters. Section 303 is silent with respect to 
these waters. Although such a grant of authority may be found implicit within this section, no 
other section of the statute may be read to help fill the gap left by its silence with respect to the 
oceans beyond the “navigable waters.” Section 304(a)’s use of the term “criteria” may be read to 
establish enforceable standards, or read as only authorizing the agency to establish guidelines. 
Nevertheless, this note concludes that these sections may not be read as granting the agency 
authority to set federal standards for federal ocean waters. Thus, the EPA would need to base a 
regulatory regime for the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic waters on the following three sources of 
authority: (1) the section 403 ocean discharge criteria; (2) section 301(b)(1)(C)’s broad mandate 
(discussed further below in the context of the ESA and MSA); and (3) water quality standards for 
the navigable waters of Louisiana established under section 303.
146 S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3716 (emphasis added), available at 1971 WL 
11307.
147 See Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 88, at 34-36 (finding that section 304(a) does grant EPA authority to set and 
enforce federal water quality criteria for federal waters)
Brad McLane Gulf Hypoxia
35
TMDL Development and Implementation: Reaching for Upstream Point Source Dischargers
The next curve along this long and winding road to a regulatory regime would be for the 
EPA to establish nitrogen and phosphorus TMDLs for the Gulf of Mexico. The EPA, working in 
conjunction with Louisiana, may clearly establish such TMDLs based upon a finding that 
Louisiana waters are impaired pursuant to 303(d). Section 303(d) itself, however, is silent with 
respect to whether a TMDL may be created in order to address a violation of section 403 criteria. 
However, this silence is not fatal. Because section 301(b)(1)(C) requires discharges to comply 
with “any other federal law or regulation,” and because regulations established pursuant to 
section 403 would constitute such “other regulations,” it is reasonable to conclude that point 
source permits under section 402 may be based upon, if not a TMDL itself, then at least a 
“TMDL-like analysis,” in order to ensure compliance with EPA regulations creating ocean 
discharge criteria under authority of section 403. As such, EPA may develop a federal TMDL for 
federal waters pursuant to sections 301(b)(1)(C) and 403, and, in conjunction with Louisiana, for 
the impaired navigable waters pursuant to section 303(d).
While implementation of TMDLs is not mandatory under the Act, it certainly would be a 
reasonable exercise of agency authority. Implementation could include a combination of the 
following three measures. First, EPA could review, and disapprove as appropriate, state water 
quality standards for upstream states under 303(c), promulgating federal criteria as necessary. 
However, in this process, EPA could only consider impairment of the navigable waters, not of 
the ocean discharge criteria downstream. Second, EPA could veto individual state-issued 
NPDES permits under its expressly delegated authority in sections 402(d)(2)(A) (in response to a 
request from a state) or 402(d)(2)(B) (an objection to a state-issued permit as “being outside the 
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guidelines and requirements of this chapter”).148 The broad authority granted to the 
Administrator under section 402(d)(2)(B) establishes that the Administrator may object to state-
issued permits citing the fact that such permits cause or contribute not only to water quality 
standards downstream, but also to downstream ocean discharge criteria. Third, EPA could create 
a framework for federal implementation of a pollution trading program for nutrient discharges as 
already discussed in detail above. Finally, environmental groups could use citizen suits and 
permit appeals to try to ensure implementation of the regime. The extent to which the EPA’s use 
of these implementation measures would withstand judicial review, as well as the ability of 
public interest groups to use citizen suits and permit appeals to keep agency implementation “on 
track,” are both open questions.
It is not clear how judicial review of an EPA 402(d)(2) permit veto would proceed. 
Imagine a case where the EPA vetoed several permits in Illinois that were each responsible for 
an almost immeasurably small “portion” of Gulf hypoxia downstream. Should the standard for 
establishing a water quality standards violation in such cases of an EPA exercise of its veto 
authority be the same as where a citizen challenges a permit? The answer to this question is not 
clear, although presumably the agency decision to exercise its authority would receive Chevron 
deference. 
Absent an EPA veto, however, environmental groups could appeal permits authorizing, 
or reauthorizing, point source discharges to upstream waters in state agency “quasi-adjudicative” 
proceedings. EPA has promulgated implementing regulations for the Clean Water Act providing 
that "No permit may be issued ... when the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance 
148
 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2001).
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with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States."149 In the case of Arkansas 
v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court upheld this regulation, as well as an EPA interpretation of it 
that a permit “should be upheld if the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
authorized discharges would not cause an actual detectable violation.”150 However, in Arkansas 
v. Oklahoma, the EPA was issuing federal permits pursuant to Section 402(a) of the Clean Water 
Act. Today, all but one of the Mississippi River Basin states have been delegated NPDES 
permitting authority and are issuing permits under 402(b),151 raising the question of whether or 
not the Arkansas v. Oklahoma holding applies to such state issued permits. The Court in 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma expressly declined to answer questions regarding the proper scope of this 
regulation in the context of state permitting.152 At the same time, however, the Court concluded 
in a footnote that this restriction does apply “whether the permit is issued by the EPA or by an 
approved state program....”153 Thus, the open question regards the meaning of this regulation in
cases where the state issues an NPDES permit pursuant to section 402(b).154
149 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (emphasis added).
150 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 97 (1992). 
151 See EPA web site at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (As of the date of publication, only six states do 
not have “primacy” to issue permits under section 402(b) of the Act. These states are Alaska, Idaho, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Arizona. Thus, New Mexico is the only state without primacy with 
some territory within the Mississippi River basin.).
152 See 503 U.S. 91, 104 (1992) (“Moreover, much of the analysis and argument in the briefs of the parties relies on 
statutory provisions that govern not only federal permits issued pursuant to §§ 401(a) and 402(a), but also state 
permits issued under § 402(b). It seems unwise to evaluate these arguments in a case such as these, which only 
involve a federal permit.”). 
153 See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 105, footnote 10.
154
 It should also be noted that Oklahoma’s antidegration policy was at issue in this case, not a violation of a numeric 
water quality standard downstream, leaving open the question of the proper interpretation of the 40 C.F.R. § 122 
“prohibitions” on discharges as applied to a permit challenge alleging contribution to an impairment of a numerical 
criterion.
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Assuming, nonetheless, that this regulation at least retains a comparable meaning in the 
context of a state administrative appeal brought by an environmental group challenging a state-
issued NPDES permit, the appellant would have an exceedingly slim chance of making the 
requisite showing of causation. As such, absent aggressive EPA use of its veto authority over 
state-issued permits that are not sufficiently stringent, permit appeals by environmental groups 
are not likely to yield tighter controls. This means that the role of environmental and citizen 
groups in pushing for implementation of any TMDL through permit appeals is not likely to be 
effective, and that any regulatory regime to restore the Gulf of Mexico would almost wholly 
depend upon an aggressive EPA exercise of delegated authority.
B. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Magnuson –Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (MSA).
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (MSA) each impose additional duties on the EPA to take actions to address 
Gulf hypoxia. Both statutes require the EPA to consult with the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) where the agency takes actions that may contribute to Gulf hypoxia. Section 7 
of the ESA requires EPA to consult with NMFS with respect to marine species, in order to 
ensure that actions “authorized, funded or carried out by such agency... [are] not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in 
the destruction or adverse modification of [critical habitat].”155 The plain language of this section 
requires the EPA to consult with NMFS prior to approving upstream state water quality 
standards that fail to properly regulate nutrients that may impair the navigable waters 
155
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2001).
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downstream.156 The MSA also requires each federal agency to “consult with the Secretary with 
respect to any action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or proposed to be authorized, funded, or 
undertaken, by such agency that may adversely affect any essential fish habitat identified under 
this chapter.”157 The ESA’s section 9 prohibits the “taking” of endangered species;158 and the 
SFA mandates measures to protect Essential Fish Habitat.159
The MSA, as amended in 1996, requires the Fishery Management Councils (Councils) to 
designate Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) as part of the development of Fishery Management Plans, 
and take measures to protect such EFH areas.160 The Councils must “describe and identify 
essential fish habitat for the fishery based on the guidelines established by the Secretary under 
section 1855(b)(1)(A) of this title, minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on such 
habitat caused by fishing, and identify other actions to encourage the conservation and 
enhancement of such habitat.”161  EFH for the Gulf of Mexico is defined to cover the entire Gulf, 
extending to “all marine waters and substrates…from the shoreline to the seaward limit of the 
156 See John W. Steiger, Consultation Provision of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act and its Application to Delegable Federal Programs, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 246 (1994). (Considering whether 
or not the consultation requirements apply to delegable federal programs, and concluding “that the weight of 
authority and sound policy support applying section 7(a)(2) to all but a few delegable federal programs”)
157
 16 U.S.C. § 1855 (b)(2) (2001).
158
 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2001).
159 See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(7) (2001) (Establishing the goal “to promote the protection of essential fish habitat in 
the review of projects conducted under Federal permits, licenses, or other authorities that affect or have the potential 
to affect such habitat.”). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(4)(A). (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to make 
recommendations to other state and federal agencies regarding activities which “would adversely affect” essential 
fish habitat.)
160 Id.
161
 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(7) (2001).
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exclusive economic zone.” 162 The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council has stated that 
“hypoxia…is a direct threat to EFH.”163
The Gulf of Mexico also provides habitat for five species of threatened or endangered sea 
turtles, including the Kemp’s Ridley (Lepidochelys kempii),164 and the threatened Gulf sturgeon 
(Acipenser oxyrinchus desotoi).165 The US Fish and Wildlife Service has found that, “in 
comparison to other fish species, sturgeon have a limited behavioral and physiological capacity 
to respond to hypoxia;” however, the area of the Gulf affected by hypoxia is not listed as critical 
habitat for the Gulf sturgeon.166
When considered in conjunction with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, these 
statutory requirements strengthen the agency’s hand in enforcing an interstate TMDL for the 
Gulf of Mexico. The CWA specifically requires all pollution discharges to comply with all 
federal laws and regulations. Section 301(b)(1)(c) of the Act states: "In order to carry out the 
objective of this chapter there shall be achieved not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent 
limitation including those necessary to meet water quality standards,... or any other Federal law 
162
 Marian Macpherson, “…To the Gulf Stream Waters:” Stewardship for Essential Fish Habitat, 18 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 97, 119 (2004) citing Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Generic Amendment for Addressing EFH 
Requirements in the FMPs of the Gulf of Mexico (Oct. 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 622), available at http:// 
Galveston.ssp.nmfs.gov/efh/FINALEFH.PDF. 
163
 Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Generic Essential 
Fish Habitat Amendment to the Fishery Management Plans of the Gulf of Mexico, July, 2003 at 3-287, available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/habitat/habitatprotection/eis/Full%20Gulf%20EFH%20EIS%20703.PDF; See also Gulf
of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Generic Amendment for Addressing EFH Requirements in the FMPs of the 
Gulf of Mexico, supra note 160 at 174-99.
164
 35 Fed. Reg. 18319 (December 2, 1970) (listing Kemp’s ridley as endangered), available at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/species_profile/servlet/gov.doi.species_profile.servlets.Species_FRDoc#top (last visited May 17, 
2005).
165 See 56 Fed. Reg. 49653 (September 30, 1991) (listing the Gulf sturgeon as threatened), available at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/servlet/gov.doi.tess_public.servlets.VipListed?code=V&listings=0.
166
 68 Fed. Reg. 13369 (March 19, 2003) (listing critical habitat for the Gulf sturgeon).
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or regulation...."167 This subsection, by its plain language, prohibits upstream discharges which 
cause or contribute to degradation of marine waters downstream in violation of the goals of not 
only the CWA, but also of other federal laws such as the MSA and the ESA. 
Surprisingly, research identified only one published case dealing with the “or any other 
federal law or regulation” language of section 301(b)(1)(C). While the Seventh Circuit rejected 
the argument that this phrase imposed additional requirements on an NPDES permit in the case 
of Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Costle,168 it did so
because the federal law at issue in that case articulated no specific standard.169 However, the 
broad mandate of Section 301(b)(1)(c) that point source discharges comply with all federal laws 
and regulations constitutes a powerful and rarely considered provision of the Act that arguably 
requires point source dischargers to comply with the provisions of the ESA and MSA. In 
addition, EPA approval of state water quality standards that fail to include nutrient criteria
constitutes an action to allow discharges that contribute to the impairment of downstream
“navigable waters.” Because this impairment degrades essential fish habitat and could harm the 
continued existence of threatened and endangered species in the Gulf, the federal approval of 
state water quality standards triggers the consultation requirement under both the Magnuson-
Stevens Act and the Endangered Species Act. 
C. Looking to Congress for a Solution: The Debates Regarding Ratification of UNCLOS 
and the Proposed Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 2005.
167
 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (2001) (emphasis added).
168 Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Costle, 571 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1978).
169 Id. at 367.
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While this note concludes that EPA does possess discretionary authority to implement a 
regulatory regime to restore the impaired waters of the Gulf of Mexico, Congress should 
nevertheless amend the CWA, granting the EPA clear authority to provide for the stewardship of 
all US jurisdictional marine waters, and clarifying the marine jurisdictional lines drawn in the 
Act. Opportunities to draw attention to the value of amending the CWA are found in two matters 
of actual or likely debate in the 109th Congress: the proposed ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the proposed Clean Water Authority Restoration Act of 
2005. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was negotiated in 
1982 and entered into force on November 16, 1994. 170 UNCLOS has been called a “constitution 
for the oceans.”171 UNCLOS contains 59 environmental provisions, including Article 192,
creating a broad obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment; Article 235, 
providing for liability for pollution of the marine environment; and Article 207, imposing a duty 
on parties to protect ocean waters through the regulation of land based sources of pollution.172
Unfortunately, the U.S. Senate has not yet ratified UNCLOS. Ratification of UNCLOS would 
entail multiple benefits for the U.S., including improved national security, greater economic 
development opportunities, improved ecological stewardship of the oceans generally, and 
170 See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
171 See, e.g.  Lakshman Guruswamy, The promise of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)Justice in Trade and Environment Disputes 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 227.
172 See UNCLOS, December 10, 1982, art. 207, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (“1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, 
pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures. 2. states shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control such 
pollution. 3. States shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level. 4. 
States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to 
establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce, and 
control pollution of the marine environment from land based sources….”)
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possibly further-extended jurisdiction over marine waters.173 As such, the U.S. Commission on 
Ocean Policy recently joined the chorus of voices recommending that the U.S. ratify 
UNCLOS.174
Throughout the history of its considerations, most commentators have expressed little 
concern that U.S. environmental laws would need to be modified to meet its obligations. In the 
Message From The President of the United States and Commentary accompanying UNCLOS’ 
transmittal to the Senate, the Clinton administration expressed confidence in the adequacy of 
then existing environmental law, stating: “The United States already has national legislation 
addressing land-based sources of marine pollution…. U.S. laws include the Clean Water Act...
which specifically addresses marine water quality.”175 On March 24, 2004, the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Environment & Public Works held a hearing to consider ratification of
UNCLOS.176 These debates are permeated with the presumption that current U.S. environmental 
laws clearly meet all of the obligations of UNCLOS and that there would be no need to enact or 
amend federal legislation as an incident of UNCLOS’ ratification.177
173 See Message From The President of the United States and Commentary Accompanying the United Nations 
Convention on the Law Of The Sea and The Agreement Relating To The Implementation Of The Part XI Upon Their 
Transmittal To The United States Senate For Its Advice And Consent. S. TREATY DOC. 103-39, 103d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1994), reprinted in 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV 77.
174 See OCEAN BLUE PRINT, supra note 46.
175 See Message from the President, supra note 173, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. at 123.
176 See “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works, 109th Congr. (2004), available at http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=219579.
177 See, Id. Statement of John F. Turner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, Department of State (“As a party, the United States would be able to implement Part XII through 
a variety of existing U.S. laws, regulations, and practices (including enforcement practices) that are consistent with 
the Convention and that would not need to change in order for the United States to meet its Convention obligations. 
For example, because our laws already provide for the protection of rare and fragile ecosystems and the habitat of 
depleted, threatened, or endangered species, no amendment to the Endangered Species Act or the Marine Mammal 
Act would be required. Nor would the Convention impose any restrictions or requirements on U.S. citizens in 
addition to what is already required by statute.”)
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The above analysis of the applicability of the Clean Water Act’s provisions to marine 
waters, however, belies this assumption that the CWA does not need to be amended in order to 
adequately implement the environmental obligations of UNCLOS.178 The U.S. Commission on 
Ocean Policy also pointed out the lack of clarity in the marine jurisdictional lines in multiple 
statutes and noted the need to “update federal laws” with respect to outdate marine 
jurisdictions.179 Even if UNCLOS does not impose additional obligations on the U.S. to amend 
its laws, the Senate should both ratify UNCLOS and contemporaneously propose legislation to 
amend the CWA. The authority of the Congress to establish rules for the protection of the oceans 
is without doubt.180 Such an amendment should require the EPA to establish water quality 
standards for all federal ocean waters between the “three mile limit” and the seaward extent of 
the EEZ within a reasonable period. 
Yet another opportunity to remedy the lack of clarity in the Clean Water Act regarding its 
jurisdiction over marine waters may be found in the proposed Clean Water Authority Restoration 
Act of 2005.181  The stated purposes of this legislation are to “reaffirm the original intent of 
Congress in enacting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972... to clearly 
define the waters of the United States that are subject to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; 
[and] to provide protection to the waters of the United States to the fullest extent of the 
178 See Robin Kundis Craig supra note 88, at 43-44 (Concluding that the Clean Water Act has “gaping holes with 
respect to compelled ocean water quality protection. [And that] These holes are particularly cavernous regarding the 
relationship between pollution in the state-controlled navigable waters and the quality of ocean waters farther out to 
sea.”).
179 See OCEAN BLUE PRINT, supra note 46, at 73.
180 See, e.g. U.S. v. State of Cal., 332 U.S. 19, 34 (1947).
181
 HR 1356, 109th Congress (1st Session, 2005); S 912, 109th Congress (1st Session, 2005).
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legislative authority of Congress under the constitution.”182 The proposed amendment would 
strike the term “navigable waters” wherever it occurs in the Act, replacing that term with the 
phrase “Waters of the United States.” The term “Waters of the United States” would be defined 
broadly to extend to essentially all internal waters, but would not expand federal jurisdiction over 
federal marine waters.183 The primary impetus for this proposed amendment was provided by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers, which held that the Clean Water Act did not confer authority to the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to assert jurisdiction over an artificially created pond, because 
this water body did not possess the requisite “significant nexus” to “navigable waters.”184  It 
would be appropriate to amend this proposed legislation to also correct the jurisdictional issues 
regarding marine waters. At the very least, debate regarding this legislation provides an 
opportunity to raise awareness among Congressional leaders regarding the lack of clarity with 
respect to the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction over marine waters. 
III. A Practical Analysis of a Regime for Gulf Hypoxia
In addition to considering the legal foundation upon which a regulatory pollution control 
regime could be constructed, it is necessary to consider the practical incentives and disincentives 
for the creation and implementation of a regulatory regime. Essentially, this inquiry considers 
whether the long road toward establishing a regulatory regime is really worth the trouble. Given 
the amount of energy and resources involved in creating a regulatory regime for Gulf hypoxia, 
182 Id.
183 Id. at § 4.
184
 531 US 159, 167 (2001).
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proponents of such a regime will need to put forth a compelling argument that the benefits of 
such a regime are worth the effort and costs. Because much of the benefit of creating such a 
regime is found in the reduction of risks, the argument for a regulatory regime must rely heavily 
on the “precautionary principle.”185 This section analyzes Gulf hypoxia using three models: an 
interest group/political capital model; an analysis of the “structural features” of the underlying 
transboundary pollution problem; and a variant of cost/benefit analysis.
One form of practical analysis of the proposed pollution control regime is essentially a 
political one. Such an analysis attempts to anticipate the likely proponents and opponents of such 
a regime, and to ascertain both the political power and moral suasion on each side of the ledger. 
A regulatory regime for the Gulf of Mexico will not form without strong support from interest 
groups possessing sufficient “political capital” that they are willing to “expend” in exerting 
pressure on elected and appointed officials. Interests that will almost certainly  resist further 
regulation include upstream states, farmers and fertilizer manufacturers, and industrial and 
municipal point sources of nutrients.  In addition, agency inertia is not to be underrated as a 
powerful force to overcome. The transformation of the currently extant voluntary regime into a 
regulatory one would entail increased administrative costs at the U.S. EPA, which the agency 
may be loathe to undertake absent specific appropriations or a clear statutory mandate. Interests 
that would likely support a regulatory pollution control regime for the Gulf of Mexico include 
fishery-related businesses and environmental groups. However, if a sufficient faction of these 
groups prefers to work toward voluntary consensus, then the current regime is almost guaranteed 
185 See United Nations, Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Principle 15, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992) (“In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”).
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to continue. Given the present lack of a statutory mandate for a Gulf hypoxia regulatory regime, 
a unified and well-organized effort by both Gulf of Mexico fishing and environmental interests 
will be necessary to create one.
Another mode of practical analysis is a “structural analysis” of the transboundary 
pollution problem itself. In his Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, Thomas Merrill 
discusses what he calls certain “unique,” structural features of transboundary pollution that “may 
account for the general failure to achieve effective collective action” to deal with it.186 For 
example, Gulf hypoxia is a clear case of what Merrill calls unidirectional, transboundary 
pollution, where the flow of pollution is one way: from upstream states to downstream waters.187
The reluctance of the “polluting states” to assist the “victim” jurisdictions downstream is 
reinforced by the fact that the primary source states are many miles and jurisdictions upstream
from the affected waters. 
On the other hand, the upstream states do have an interest in reducing nutrient pollution 
for their own benefit, they just may not see any value added to participating in a regime that is 
focused on attaining an outcome in distant downstream waters. The nutrient pollution that causes 
Gulf hypoxia constitutes what Merrill calls “partial transboundary pollution.” 188 While the 
degree of oxygen depletion in the downstream jurisdiction is particularly severe, significant 
localized adverse impacts do occur within the source states as a result of the same pollutants that 
cause Gulf hypoxia. In fact, the EPA concluded in 2002 that about 18% of America’s stream 
miles and 22% of its lakes, reservoirs and ponds are impaired due to nutrient pollution, and the 
186 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 47 DUKE L.J. 931 (1997).
187 See Id. at 971. For purposes of clarifying the contradistinction, the US/Canada border provides an example of 
“reciprocal transboundary pollution,” as flowing waters tend to flow both North and South along this long border.
188 See Id. at 970.
Brad McLane Gulf Hypoxia
48
largest nutrient source states in the Mississippi River Basin are no exception. 189 The upstream 
states are more likely to participate in a regulatory regime to reduce nutrient pollution if they 
become convinced that participation would help them improve water quality at home.190
Another mode of analysis is the familiar “cost/benefit” model. Merrill analyses “the 
conditions that give rise to regimes of collective action in the multijurisdictional environmental 
context,”191 concluding that “the general criterion for determining when any type of collective 
action regime will arise is that the benefits of the regime in terms of reducing externalities must 
exceed the costs of creating and sustaining the regime.”192  Perhaps better than any other, this
relatively simple model explains why Gulf hypoxia is being addressed under a voluntary regime
at present.  Both the “start up” and “maintenance” costs of a regulatory regime to address Gulf 
hypoxia would be high. 
Applying the structural and cost/benefit forms of analysis, the case of Gulf hypoxia may 
be juxtaposed with hypoxia in New York’s Long Island Sound, where the problem is being 
addressed through a regulatory regime implemented through a pollutant trading framework.193
189 See US EPA, 2002 305(b) Water Quality Report to Congress,  Available at 
http://www.epa.gov/305b/2000report/.
190
 On the other hand, as noted earlier, modest increases in nutrient loading are generally correlated with more 
productive fisheries. This raises the specter of a concern, that nutrient reductions required to support the Gulf could 
cut back so much on nutrient loading in the source states that fisheries would be become less productive. This 
concern arose on the Chattahoochee River which forms the border between Alabama and Georgia. Nutrient 
reductions were implemented to address eutrophication and oxygen concerns. These reductions were so successful 
that the bass fishery suffered adverse impacts from the perspective of anglers who wished to see the reservoirs 
teaming with large, fat, largemouth bass. (cite needed). While, on balance, reduced nutrient loadings should have 
mostly positive impacts on upstream ecosystems as well as reduce hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico, the potential for 
some backlash must be acknowledged.
191 See Merrill, supra note 185, at 972, citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347 (1967).
192 Id. (emphasis added)
193 See Professor Ann Powers, The Current Controversy Regarding TMDLs: Contemporary Perspectives, “TMDLs 
and Pollutant Trading,”  4 RES COMMUNES: VT.’S J. ENV’T 2 (2002-2003). 
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Gulf hypoxia is unlike Long Island Sound hypoxia in that: (1) the underlying hypoxia problems 
are structurally different in that the sources of Gulf hypoxia are further removed from the 
problems; (2) the costs of coordinating a regulatory regime involving thirty-one states would be 
much higher; (3) the adverse impacts of Gulf hypoxia may be more uncertain; and, (4) the 
majority of the nutrient pollution impairing Long Island Sound stems from point sources.194
A wild card in the cost/benefit analysis of the proposed regulatory regime for the Gulf of 
Mexico is found in the extent of uncertainty regarding the level of reductions which may 
reasonably be anticipated to occur as a result of currently existing regulatory programs. Existing 
regulatory requirements upstream and upwind will arguably lead to reductions in loading with or 
without another layer of regulation. For example, reductions of point sources should occur 
through ongoing implementation of the Clean Water Act, including TMDL development and 
implementation in upstream states. Also, regulation of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides under 
the recently promulgated Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 195 will further decrease air deposition 
of nitrogen. EPA estimates that CAIR will reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by 53%.196 Given 
that atmospheric deposition accounts for an estimated fifteen to thirty percent of the nitrogen 
loading in most U.S. estuaries, such reductions may significantly reduce Gulf hypoxia.197 These 
factors argue in favor of the voluntary, wait-and-see approach. 
On the other hand, the idea of an ocean bottom larger than the size of Massachusetts that 
is unable to support fish and shellfish is troubling, and the possibility of rapid ecological collapse 
194 Id.
195
 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96.
196 See, US EPA, Clean Air Interstate Rule, Preamble at 17, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/cair/pdfs/cair_final_preamble.pdf.
197 See, US EPA, Clean Air Interstate Rule Preamble, at 752.
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is sobering. Furthermore, reductions in nutrients to benefit the Gulf will also bring net benefits to 
upstream state waters. While difficult or even impossible to quantify, these benefits could be
substantial, including more healthy ecosystems and improved public health.198 Strategies such as 
wetlands protection and restoration also yield multiple benefits in the form of increasing 
recharge of aquifers and reducing the severity and frequency of flooding impacts. Finally, a 
pollution trading program could reduce the costs of implementing the required pollution control 
reductions, making a regulatory regime more appealing under cost-benefit analysis from the 
perspective of regulated entities. On the other hand, administration of such a trading program
will likely increase the EPA’s costs of creating and maintaining a regime.
Ultimately, the question of how to respond to Gulf hypoxia is, at best, only partially
answered by cost/benefit analysis. We must determine the level of risk that we are willing to take 
in reducing the risk of catastrophic ecosystem collapse, as well as the level of ecosystem 
degradation that we are willing to tolerate. If we view the risks to be acceptably low, or too 
uncertain to form a basis for action, then the current regime of study and voluntary reductions is
appropriate. However, a risk-averse, precautionary approach is the more appropriate path given 
the extent of human alteration of the Gulf of Mexico’s ecosystem, the uncertainty of the long-
term consequences of hypoxia, the multiple benefits of solutions such as wetlands protection and 
creation. Such a precautionary approach calls for an enforceable, regulatory regime to compel 
action. 
198
 For example, treatment byproducts, such as trihalomethanes, are common drinking water contaminants that are a 
byproduct of the disinfection of drinking water with chlorine or chlorinated compounds. Treatment byproduct 
formation is correlated with greater amounts of organic material in drinking water supplies. Thus, decreasing 
nutrients in drinking water source rivers, will lead to less eutrophication, resulting in less organic matter in these 
systems, which will yield less carcinogens in our drinking water supply. To the author’s knowledge, and despite his 
best efforts, he has been unable to locate any studies estimating such benefits.
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IV. Recommendations
In conclusion, the threats to the Gulf of Mexico’s aquatic ecosystem imposed by hypoxia 
are serious, and they demand more aggressive action to restore these waters in light of the risk of 
ecosystem collapse. These actions should include the following: 
1. Congress should amend the Clean Water Act in two ways. Congress should 
adjust the jurisdictional lines in the Act to clarify the law and to make the law 
consistent with general U.S. jurisdiction over marine waters. Ideally, all 
references to the “contiguous zone” should be replaced with the term “exclusive 
economic zone.” The term “territorial seas,” for the sake of clarity, should be 
replaced with the term “state marine waters,” and should continue to apply to a 
three-mile band of waters. Congress should then clearly delegate to the EPA the 
duty to set water quality standards for all federal waters between the reach of 
the state marine waters and the furthest extent of the EEZ by an appropriate 
deadline. The ocean discharge criteria should be retained to provide an 
additional layer of protection for state and federal waters. The term “oceans” 
should be retained to provide the EPA with discretionary jurisdiction to regulate 
discharges of pollution beyond the EEZ.
2. Congress should instruct the EPA to study a pollution trading program for the 
Mississippi River basin and produce a report within a reasonable period of time. 
At the time such a report is completed, Congress should consider whether to 
mandate such a trading program, or leave the matter to resolution through the 
exercise of EPA discretion.
3. Irregardless of Congressional action, EPA should develop federal “healthy 
ocean waters” standards for exclusively federal waters under Sections 403 for 
federal waters generally along the lines that the agency previously suggested.. 
Such section 403 standards, however, should retain the existing level of 
protection provided within the “CWA 3-mile territorial seas,” as well as apply a 
greater level of protection in federal waters extending from 3 to 200 miles from 
shore. EPA should also clearly require upstream dischargers to not cause or 
contribute to violation of these standards. Despite the lack of clarity in the law, 
EPA should also cite to sections 304(a) and 303 as alternative sources of 
authority.
4. EPA, LDEQ, and stakeholders should evaluate whether hypoxia occurs in 
Louisiana jurisdictional waters. EPA should consider disapproving the State of 
Louisiana’s 303(d) list and promulgate a federal list including Louisiana state 
waters impaired due to Gulf hypoxia if such action is necessary and supported 
by adequate information.
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5. Louisiana should propose stronger water quality standards for nutrients, and 
should also consider clarifying its dissolved oxygen criteria for marine waters, 
ensuring that appropriate dissolved oxygen standards apply throughout the 
water column. The EPA should review any resulting standards in consultation 
with NMFS and USFWS to make certain that LDEQ nutrient standards are 
protective of Gulf of Mexico waters. 
6. The EPA should review water quality standards state by state for upstream 
states as each state conducts its triennial reviews. EPA should consult with
NMFS in the process of reviewing these standards as required by the ESA and 
SFA. EPA should disapprove any state water quality standards that fail to 
include adequate nutrient water quality standards, and promulgate federal 
nutrient water quality standards to address these waters as appropriate.
7. EPA should immediately commence development of two interstate TMDL s for
the Gulf of Mexico for the parameters of nitrogen and phosphorus, considering 
an enforceable pollution-trading framework as one option for their
implementation. 
8. Finally, research and monitoring of Gulf hypoxia should be adequately funded. 
Because of the lack of clarity regarding the actual and potential ecological and 
fishery impacts of the continuing annual cycle of hypoxia in the Gulf of 
Mexico, sufficient funding for research is critical.
